Anthropic asks full D.C. Circuit to rehear Pentagon supply-chain ruling

Anthropic filed a petition for panel rehearing or rehearing en banc in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on 13 October 2026, in Nos. 26-1049 (lead) and 26-1162 (consolidated), Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War.

No. 26-1049 (lead); No. 26-1162 (consolidated) UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT ANTHROPIC PBC, Petitioner, v. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF WAR ... PETITION FOR PANEL REHEARING OR REHEARING EN BANC ... October 13, 2026

The petition asks the court to rehear the case after a divided panel decided it on 25 September 2026; its conclusion says only that the court should grant the petition.

A divided panel upheld that extraordinary designation. ... CONCLUSION The Court should grant the petition.

In the 25 September opinion, Judge Katsas wrote for the court and Judge Henderson dissented.

Before: HENDERSON, KATSAS, and RAO, Circuit Judges. Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge KATSAS. Dissenting opinion filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

The opinion says the Department of War excluded Claude from its supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018 after Anthropic refused to relax contractual prohibitions on the use of Claude for lethal autonomous warfare or domestic surveillance.

This case arises from a decision by the Department of War to exclude Claude, an artificialintelligence product developed by petitioner Anthropic PBC, from its supply chain under the Federal Acquisition Supply Chain Security Act of 2018. The Department made this decision after Anthropic refused to relax contractual prohibitions on the use of Claude for lethal autonomous warfare or domestic surveillance.

The panel held that the Department had ample support for concluding that continued integration of Claude into its information systems, by the Department or its contractors, presented a statutorily covered national-security risk.

The Department had ample support for its conclusion that the continued integration of Claude into the Department's information systems, by the Department or its contractors, presented a statutorily covered national-security risk.

The petition argues that the majority read the statute's words "otherwise manipulate" to mean "arrange, operate, or control" regardless of subversive intent, so that the statute "turns on what Anthropic does, not why Anthropic does it."

Instead, it interpreted "otherwise manipulate" to mean "arrange, operate, or control"-- regardless of any subversive intent--so that the statute "turns on what Anthropic does, not why Anthropic does it."

It says that reading conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in Fischer v. United States, and that Judge Henderson's dissent read the clause as reaching intentionally subversive and deceptive acts.

That expansive interpretation conflicts with Fischer v. United States, 603 U.S. 480 (2024). As Judge Henderson explained in dissent, an "otherwise" clause takes meaning from the terms it follows, which here "connote intentionally subversive and deceptive acts."

On process, the petition says the Secretary bypassed the statute's pre-designation notice and opportunity to respond, that the majority held the violations harmless, and that this conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in Trump v. Cook.

The Secretary bypassed those protections, invoking "an urgent national security interest" in a single conclusory sentence. App.225. The majority deemed the procedural violations harmless ... That defies precedent, including Trump v. Cook, 146 S.Ct. 2234, 2255 (2026)

On due process, the petition says the D.C. Circuit's precedents require notice and an opportunity to respond before a national-security designation absent a showing of particularized need, and that the majority deferred to the Secretary's assertions of urgency.

This Court's due process precedents require notice and an opportunity to respond before a national-security designation is imposed--even for putative foreign terrorist organizations--absent a "showing of particularized need." ... The majority eviscerated that particularized-need standard by deferring to the Secretary's bare assertions of urgency despite obvious inconsistencies.

On the First Amendment, the petition says the Northern District of California found direct evidence that Anthropic's speech motivated a parallel designation, in a ruling of 27 August 2026, while the majority here discerned no evidence of retaliatory intent.

Despite the Department's own words, the majority "discern[ed]" no evidence of retaliatory intent. Add.41. On a materially similar record, the Northern District of California found "direct evidence that Anthropic's speech" motivated a parallel designation. Anthropic PBC v. Department of War, 2026 WL 2534714, at *14 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2026).

The petition says fifteen amicus briefs were filed, including from trade associations, former national-security officials, 149 former judges, civil-liberties organizations and AI professionals.

Fifteen amicus briefs--from trade associations, former national-security officials, 149 former judges, civil-liberties organizations, and AI professionals--confirm the decision's far-reaching consequences.

According to the petition, the Secretary sent Anthropic a notice on 4 March 2026 designating it a supply-chain risk under 41 U.S.C. section 4713, and a separate notice designated it under 10 U.S.C. section 3252.

After further negotiations, the Secretary sent Anthropic a notice on March 4 designating the company a supply-chain risk under 4713. App.72-73. A separate notice designated Anthropic a supply-chain risk under 10 U.S.C. 3252.

It says Anthropic petitioned this court for review of the section 4713 designation on 9 March and challenged the section 3252 designation in the Northern District of California.

On March 9, Anthropic petitioned for review of the 4713 designation in this Court under 41 U.S.C. 1327. It simultaneously challenged the 3252 designation in its home venue, the Northern District of California.

The petition says that because this court's jurisdiction over section 4713 challenges is exclusive, the panel decision will be the last word short of Supreme Court review.

And because this Court's jurisdiction over 4713 challenges is "exclusive," 41 U.S.C. 1327(b)(3), the decision will be the last word short of Supreme Court review.